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UNITED S'l'ATES 
cert to CAl (Aldrich, Campbe ll, 
Gignou x [DJ] ) 
U}-e_~~~~--o~~~£1~ 
v. . -s 
SALVUCHI a nd ZACKULAR W hvo Federal/Criminal Time ly 
SUMMARY: In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), /) 
------ /(ld /)~ 
the Court held that criminal defendants have "automatic £~J I
standing" to challenge Fourth Amendme nt violations in the z! lu/Jtk 
seizure of items underlying a charge of a possessory offense. ~]at . - -
The SG asks the Court to d ecide whether Jones rema ins good law. fiK.-
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Zackular and Salvucci were 
indicted f or unlaw f ul posse ~s ion 6f checks stolen from the 
C, F /(! eJf .,,4-..v --1-e 5,.. a.._\ - I,.._.,.._. a.fs;. ~e.Q..Q 
&:J""-~,Q;:z...,._e..e., t1. -j/-.e .... r•--. -ji--~ <7~ ~~ ~ 
~ , .... ~.z...r ~ ... #'"'&A.JtOL_ a ... ~ 
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mails. 18 U.S.C. § 1708. Agents act1' , ng pursuant to a warrant, 
had seized the checks from an apartment rented by zackular's 
wife. -The district court held that the affadav 1't supporting 
the warrant did not establish probable caus; 
""--- _____..., . CAl agreed ~nd I 
also concluded that Jones gave resps "automat1· c standing" to 
seek exclusion of the evidence. 
It wrote: 
To contest a 
search and seizure on Fourth Amendment grounds, 
a defendant must have either "actual standing" or 
"automatic standing." To have actual ·sta11ding, a 
de~;t"establish a legitimate and reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the premises searched or 
the property seized. Rakas v. Illinois, 47 U.S.L.W. 
4025 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1978) ; see Brown v. United States, 
411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973). We agree with the Gov-
ernment that neither defendant has actual standing 
to contest the lawfulness of the search and seizures. 
Nejther defendants has established a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the premises searched or the 
property seized, nor has either of them ever claimed 
a proprietary or possessory interest in the premises 
or the checks. I d. 
Both defendants, however, have automatic stand-
ing to object to the search and seizures under Jones 
v. fJniiedStates, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In Jones, the 
Supreme Court held that a defendant has autorpatic 
standi:nz to challenge the JegaiTty of ~arch or sei?..-
ure if charged with a crime that includes, as an es-














of the seized evidence at the time of the contested 
search and seizure. The Court offered a twofold ra-
tionale in support of this rule: ( 1) the unfairness 
of requiring the defendant to assert a proprietary or 
possessory interest in the premises searched or the 
items seized when his statements could later be used 
at trial to prove a crime of possessfon; and (2) the 
vice of prosecutorjal self-contradiction, that is, a)-
lowing the Government to allege possession as part 
of the crime charged, and yet deny that there was 
possession sufficient for standing purposes. !d. at 261-
65; Brown v. United States, supra at 229. 
The fitst part of this twofold rationale was es-
sentiall r eliminated by the Supreme Court's holding 
in Si1!!!J!&nS v. nited States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94 
(1968), that a defendant's testimony in support of a 
motion to suppress may not be used against him at 
trial. The S~preme Court itself has questioned, but 
unfortunately not decided, whether the second prong 
of the Jones rationale, prosecutorjal self-contradictjon, 
alone justifies the continued vitality of the doctrine 
of automatic standing. See rRalcas v. Illinois, suvra 
at 4027 n.4; Brown v. United States, supra at 228, 
229. Since the Supreme Court first questioned the 
vitality of this doctrine in B1·own, there has been a 
split of authority as to whether the doctrine survives. 
~
Compare United States v. Riquelnty, 572 F.2d 947, 
950-51 (2d Cir. 1978), and United States v. Boston, 
510 F.2d 35, ~7-38 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 990 (1975) (doctrine survives) with United 
States v. Delgu.yd, 542 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1976) 
(doctrine does not survive). Until the Supreme · 
Court rules on this question, we are not prepared 
to hold that. the automatic standing rule of Jones 
has been implicitly overruled by Simmons. That is 


















The SG cites other cases involving this issue. Compare 
United States v. Grunsfeld, 558 F.2d 1231, 1241-42 (6th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, i134 U.S. 872, 1016 (1978) (following 
Delguyd; alternate holdings); United States v. Smith, 495 F.2d 
668, 670 (lOth Cir. 1974) (Brown mandates inquiry into 
existence of "personal right protected by Fourth Amendment"); 
United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 896 (5th Cir. 1978) (en 
bane) (dissenting opinion of five judges) (automatic standing 
should be rejected; "Simmons ..• gave all but the coup de 
grace); id. at 892 (majority opinion) ("serious doubts" in 
light of Simmons, but finding standing on alternate ground), 
with United States v. Ullrich, 580 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 
1978) (judges dissenting in Edwards feel bound by Jones and 
prior Fifth Circuit authority to apply automatic standing 
rule); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1977) 
("misgivings," but rule persists in circuit pending Supreme 
Court rejection of Jones); United States v. Galante, 547 F.2d 
733, 737 (2d Cir. 1976) ("overruling Jones is propeily a matter 
for the Supreme Court"); United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 
1296, 1299 (8th Cir. 1977) (Simmons does not remove "vice of 
prosecutorial self-contradiction''; rule to be retained "in the 
absence of a clear mandate from the Supreme Court"). See also 
United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165, 1167 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(7th Cir. 1976) (articulating tule but distinguishing case); 
United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(same); United States v. Dye, 508 _F.2d 1226, 1232-34 (6th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975). 
DISCUSSION : This case appears to raise a substantial and 




and has generated specific invitations from the lower courts to 
reevaluate a precedent that this Court has itself questioned . 
I recommend a CFR.* Unless resps identify a procedural 
obstacle to effective review, I also recommend a grant. 
~ ) r0 c e l()C\~' u c 'L~- · There is no response. \-<,F""'i\-< - ~ -
9/11/79 Coenen opn in petn 
*The respondents have fil ~ a waiver of their right to respond. 
I assume that, under the circumstances, a CFR might still be 
appropriate in a seemin certw~rthy case. 
JS 11/30/79 
MEMORANDUM 




No. 79-244 and No. 79-5146 raise the question whether 
the automatic standing rule of Jones v~ United States, 362 U.S. 
257 (1960) should be overruled. 
issue presented in No. 79-244, 
illegal arrest issue. Therefore, 
hold No. 79-5146. 
The Jones question is the only 
but 79-5146 also raises an 
I would ~No. 79~and 
No. 79-393 raises the closely related question whether 
a possessory interest in contraband confers Rctual standing to 
challenge a search and seizure. As the cert. memo notes, there 
are some problems with the record with this case, but they do 
not appear substantial enough to prevent 
the actual standing issue. Accordingly, 
393 and set it down for argument with No. 
the Court from deciding 
I would ~No. 79- '3 
79-244. ~--·-----
Court Argued ................... . 
... • • 0 •• 
Submitted · · · · · · · · · · . , 19 . .. 
.. . . • • 0 • • 0 •••••• , 19 ... 
Voted on December 7 
Assigned . . . .. . ........... ' 19... ' 1979 




lons of Also mot. dents for l ~ eave 6 (.A~ proceed 
and rec . e1ved. 
//;p /~~ 'i~ 






TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: David 
DATE: March 21, 1980 
RE: No. 79-244, United States v. Salvucci and Zackular; No. 79-
5146, Rawlings v. Kentucky 
Main Question Presented: 
Whether the Court should abandon the "automatic standing" 
doctrine of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), which 
permits a defendant charged with a possessory offense to seek 
suppression of evidence regardless of his relationship to its 
seizure? 
INTRODUCTION: 
The Salvucci case involves .onl¥ automatic --- standing. Rawlings, however, concerns an arrest issue as well as a couple of 
miscellaneous questions. I will focus first on automatic standing, 
and pick up the additional issues in Rawlings at the end of the memo. 
BACKGROUND: 
2. 
Salvucci -- Pursuant to a search warrant, the Massachusetts 
State Police found 12 checks in the apartment of Zackular's mother. 
The checks had been stolen from the mails. The opinion below and the 
briefs submitted in this case provide no direct information as to the 
methods employed in the search. Indeed, the opinion of CA 1 repeated 
the error in the application for a search warrant, which had 
identified the apartment as belonging to Zackular's wife rather than 
his mother. In any event, we do not know how the police carne across 
the checks, or how the checks had been stored. This lack of facts 
may make responsible resolution of the case somewhat difficult. 
Salvucci and Zackular successfully argued before the DC and 
CA1 that the stolen checks should be suppressed as evidence because 
the affidavit underlying the warrant was inadequate. CA 1 rejected 
the Government's claim that they had no standing to challenge the 
search of a third party's apartment, citing Jones. The Court of 
Appeals conceded that there was some tension between the rule in 
Jones and the Court's opinion in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 u.s. 128 
( 1978), but concluded that until this Court resolved that tension, 
Jones should be followed. 
Rawlings -- Rawlings was in the horne of Marquess with four. 
other people when the Kentucky State Pol ice arrived with an arrest 
warrant for Marquess. 
asked Vanessa Cox to 
Immediately before their arrival, Rawlings had 
store his drugs in her purse. She agreed 
reluctantly, and then asked him to remove the drugs. He agreed to 
take back the drugs, but said he had to use the bathroom first. When 
he returned, the police had already arrived. The police walked 
through the apartment looking for Marquess. They did not find him, 
3. 
but smelled burnt marijuana and saw what appeared to be marijuana 
seeds on a mantel. The pol ice then netained Rawlings and the four 
others while a search warrant was obtained. During the detention 
period, the police told the five that they were free to leave if they 
consented to a personal search. Two of the people agreed and left. 
After forty-five minutes, the police returned with a search warrant 
for the apartment, but not for any of the people in it. The police 
then ordered Vanessa Cox to empty her handbag. The drugs were 
exposed. She turned to Rawlings and said, "Take what is yours." 
Rawlings then claimed the drugs and was placed under arrest. The 
police found $4500 on him a a knife in a sheath. 
Rawlings unsuccessfully attempted to suppress the evidence 
before and during his trial, but the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
reversed his conviction. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed yet 
again, in an extraordinary opinion. The court stated, "All in all we 
confess that we find the concept of 'standing' totally 
incomprehensible and, to the extent of overlap with Fourth Amendment 
~~-----------------
rights, equally incapable of understandinq." The court determined 
that Rawlings "probably" did not have standing, and then went on to 
make a rather convoluted finding that Rawlings had no "automatic" 
standing to make a Fourth Amendment challenge because he admitted on 
the spot that he owned the drugs. Finally hitting on a rational 
idea, the Court added that, in any event, Rawlings had no "legitimate 
or reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion" in 
Vanessa Cox's purse. 
4. 
AUTOMATIC STANDING 
The automatic standing doctrine flows from two perceived 
dangers when a defendant charged with a possessory offense attempt to 
suppress evidence as illegally seized. 1) "The Dilemma of Self-
Incrimination" -- By arguing at 
standing to challenge the search 
a suppression hearinq that he had 
and seizure due to his property 
interest in the seized material, the defendant would prejudice his 
case on the substantive charge of possession. 2) "The Vice of 
Prosecutorial Self-Contradiction" By opposing standing to make a 
suppression motion in a possessory case, the Government is placed in 
the position of arguing pretrial that a defendant has no interest in 
the seized material and at trial that he indeed possessed it. 
The dilemma of sel f-iner iminat ion is decidedly less now, 
after the Court's decision in Simmons v. United States, 390 u.s. 377 
(1968), which held that a defendant's testimony at a pretrial hearinq 
could not be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief. The defendants 
in these cases insist that the dilemma is still very real because the 
statements are still admissible for impeachment, for showinq prior 
inconsistent statements in some jurisdictions, and as the basis of 
prosecutorial "fishing expeditions." The SG responds that the proper 
solution to those problems -- if indeed they be problems is to 
extend Simmons to impeachment situations, etc., not to grant 
"automatic standing" to pursue a pretrial motion. Of course, these 
cases do not present the question of extending Simmons, so the Court 
could not reach a holding on that suggest ion. In addition, the 
strongest claim of petrs -- the fear of self-incrmination throuqh 
impeachment -- is not the sort of claim that has appealed very much 
5. 
to the Court in recent years. In Harris v. New York, 401 u.s. 222 
( 1971), the Court permit ted impeachment with statements taken in 
violation of Miranda. The theory of that case was that a defendant 
should not be free to change his story without facing impeachment. 
And in Havens v. United States this Term, the Court has tentatively 
resolved to permit anmission of otherwise inadmissable evidence for 
impeachment on cross-eximination. 
The vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction is a thornier 
-...,____ - --...... 
issue. First, I am not sure just how grievous a vice it is. After 
all, we permit litigants to argue all sorts of inconsistent 
propositions. There may be something a bit superficially unsavory 
about having the Government bloodthirstily changing its story back 
and forth in order to acquire a convict ion. But, then again, the 
current focus of Fourth Amendment doctrine on personal "expectations 
of privacy" may undermine this apparent claim. The inconsistency 
that Jones saw in the law was that the Government would argue 
pretrial that the defendant did not have a sufficient possessory 
interest in the object to challenge the seizure. At trial, however, 
the Government's claim would be that the defendant did indeed possess 
the object. The SG goes throuqh a lengthy argument based on 
"constructive possession" to demonstrate that there is in fact little 
inconsistency between the two positions. I f i nd the S G' s position -----somewhat tortured and eventually unpersuasive. Instead, I would 
commend the State of Kentucky's view. Kentucky argues that Jones 
responded to the Fourth Amendment doctrine of the day, which was 
based on property law 
~
however, the Court looks to 
----privacy in each circumstance to determine 
6. 
whether there is a Fourth Amendment violation. The actual possession 
of a particular item is simply one element of that general 
determination. Under this view, the Government argues at pretrial 
only that the petr had no legitimate expectation of privacy, not that 
he did not possess the seized items. 
sense. 
,.I..---
On balance, I think that Kentucky's approach makes the most 
The Court seems quite resolved to apply the "legitimate 




Indeed, the law certainly needs a single principle for such 
Rakas jettisoned 
and I think it 
the "legitimately-on-the-premises" stran.d of } 
clearly foreshadowed a similar junking of ~ 
automatic standing. The naqg ing quest ion in my mind is how this 
outcome might affect defendants in setting trial strategy. A 
defendant would be in the position of arguing at the pretrial hearing 
that a search violated his legitimate expectation of privacy in a 
particular place at a particular time under certain circumstances. 
The deterrninat ion of how legit irnate his expectation was might well 
take into account the nature of the object e.g., keeping an 
elephant in your backyard would not likely raise a legitimate 
expectation that the police would not become aware of the elephant's 
existence. To the extent that the inquiry focused on the particular 
item, there would be the same logical inconsistency that troubled the 
Jones Court. But the inconsistency seems much less telling in this 
context, where a constellation of factors must be considered. The 
ruling on the suppression motion will also turn on the nature of the 
premises, the relationship of the defendant to the premises, and how 
the i tern was stored. Indeed, the Government is far more likely to 
focus on those questions than to disprove the defendant's 
possession of the so prosecutorial self-
contradiction seems 
Thus, reasons initially given by the Jones Court 
automatic s have almost all paled. 
for \ 
Simmons reduced the self-
incrirni problem, and the expectation-of-privacy theory has 
the Government's self-contradictions. For resolution of this 
this case, I would endorse the approach taken in Rakas. 
I would hold that Fourth Amendment standing doctrine is superseded by 
the privacy-expectation decision. Thus, 
suppression motion should center on whether the 
defendant's legitimate expectations of privacy. 
the inquiry on at 
officials invaded the 
Salvucci -- This outcome would resolve the question raised 
in Salvucci, and would most likely require a remand to the District 
Court for findings on The record in Salvucci does not 
-~----
reflect the relationship between the defendants and the apartment of 
Zackular's mother, nor is there any indication of how the police carne 
upon the stolen checks or how the checks had been stored. All of 
those factors would be relevant to a determination on the substantive 
question. 
Rawlings -- The record in this case is probably sufficient 
to rule on the merits of the suppression motion. Rawlings clearly 
placed the drugs in Vanessa Cox's purse in order to remove them from 
public view. He was seeking privacy. I would question whether any 
expectation of privacy was reasonable. He knew that she did not want 
8. 
to hold the drugs, and also knew that if she consented to a search 
they would be found. Thus, I would affirm the denial of the motion 
to suppress. 
~lings also involves a challenge to the detention of the 
five people in the Marquess apartment while the police acquired a 
search warrant. The detention may well have taken place in violation 
of the standards outlined in Brown v. Texas last Term. Certainly the 
knife taken from Rawlings did not provide any basis for a Terry stop, 
since he made no menacing gestures. Still, I do not think that 
Rawlings can win on this argument. He needs to suppress the drugs 
seized during the search of Vanessa Cox. I do not think he can 
challenge her detention, since Fourth Amendment rights are personal, 
not "vicarious." (Admittedly, an element of standing begins to creep 
in here: I think the Court would be well-advised to avoid using the 
terminology, however.) Once the police had the drugs in her purse, 
Rawlings said they were his. I see no constitutional infirmity in 
this, since there is every reason to believe she would have told the 
police they were his, thereby giving the police ample cause to arrest 
him. To the extent that the detention of Rawlings was 
unconstitutional, he can point to no particular harm that resulted 
from it, since presumably the police could have arrested him anywhere 
in the state once Vanessa Cox identified the drugs as his. 
Consequently, I would also affirm Rawlings' conviction. 
79-244 U.S. v. SALVUCCI ~ ft ( Argued 3/26/80 
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1st DRAFT 
S.UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm 
No. 79-244 
United States, Petitioner, l 
On Writ of Certiorari to United 
v. . States Court of Appeals for the 
John M. SalvucCI, Jr. and First Circuit. 
Joseph G. Zackular. 
[April -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Relying on Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960), 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that since 
respondents were charged with crimes of possession, they were 
entitled to claim "automatic standing" to challenge the le-
gality of the search which produced the evidence against them, 
without regard to whether they had an expectation of privacy 
in the premises searched. United States v. Salvucci, 599 F. 
2d 1094 (1979). Today we hold that defendants charged 
with crimes of possession may only claim tlie benefits of the 
excluSIOnary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have a~ .. u... -
in fact been violated. The automatic standing rule of Jones t~-:..:.=....-
v. tFnited States, supra, is therefore overruled.  
1 
Respondents, John Salvucci and Joseph Zackular, were 
charged in a federal indictment with 12 counts of unlaw-
ful possession of stolen mail, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1708. 
The 12 checks which formed the basis of the indictment had 
been seized by the Massachusetts police during the search of 
an apartment renteJi_ b}' resmndent Zackular's mother. The 
searcnwas conductedPursuant to a warrant. 
Respondents filed a motion to suppress the checks on the 
ground that the affidavit supporting the application for the 
79-244-0PINION 
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search warrant was inadequate to demonstrate probable cause. 
The District Court granted respondents' motions and ordered 
that the checks be suppressed.1 The Government sought 
reconsideration of the District Court's ruling, colltending that 
respondents lacked "standi11g" to challenge the constitution-
ality of the search. The District Court reaffirmed its suppres-
sion order and the government appealed. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that respondents 
had "standing" and the search warrant was constitutionally 
inadequate. The court fou11d that the respondents were not 
required to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the premises searched or the property seized because they were 
entitled to assert "automatic standiug" to object to the search 
and seizure under Jones v. United States, supra. The court 
observed that the vitality of the Jones doctrine had been 
challenged in recent years, but that "[u]ntil the Supreme 
CourL rules on this questiou, we arc not prepared to hold 
that the automatic standing rule of Jones has been ... 
overruled. . . . That is an issue which the Supreme Court 
must resolve." 599 F. 2d, at 1098. The Court of Appeals 
was obviously correct in its characterization of the status of 
Jones, and we granted certiorari in order to resolve the cou-
troversy.~ - U. 8.- (1979). 
II 
As early as 1907, this Court took the position that remedies 
1 The District Court. held that. the ntridnvit wa deficient becau~e the 
affiant I•clied on double hears<LY, and failed to :specify the dates ou which 
information included in the affidavit had bPen obtained. 
~The courts of appeab haw dividPd on the continued applicability of 
the automatic :standing rult•. Tho Sixth Cin·uit abanclonrd thP rule after 
our clPci:sion in .Simmons v. United ~tati'S, :390 U. ::3. 377 (196R). Sec, 
e. y., C'nited l::itates v. Huuter, 550 F. 2d 1066 (CA6 1977). Most of 
the remmmng rircuit~ appear to have retaiuecl the rule, but many w1th 
' ' mi~givlllgs . " See, e. g., Uuited States v. Oates, 560 F. 2d 45, 52 (CA2 
Hl77) ; United States v. Edtcards, 577 F. 2cl H83, 892 (CA5), cort. denied, , 
439 u . . 968 (1978) , 
79-244-0PINION 
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for violations of constitutional rights would only be aft'orded 
to a person who "belongs to the class for whose sake the con-
stitutional protection is given." Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 
152, 160. The exclusionary rule is one form of remedy af-
forded for Fourth Amendmeut violations, and the Court in 
Jones v. United States held that the Hatch v. Reardon prin-
ciple properly limited its availability. The Court reasoned 
that ordinarily "it is entirely proper to require of one who 
seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for sup-
pressing relevant evidence that he ... establish, that he 
himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy." 362 U. S., 
at 261. Subsequent attempts to vicariously assert violations 
of the Fourth Amendmeut rights of others have been re-
peatedly rejected by this Court. Alderman v. United States, 
394 U. S. 165, 174 (1969); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 
223, 230 (1973). Most recently, in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128 (1978), we held that, "[i]t is proper to permit only de-
fendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated 
to benefit from the [exclusionary] rule's protections." !d., 
at 134. 
Even though the Court in Jones recognized that the exclu-
sionary rule should only be available to protect defendants 
who have been the victims of an illegal search or seizure, the 
Court thought it necessary to establish an exception. In cases 
where possession of the seized evidence was an essen£Ialere-
me'tlt of Q!_e otTense cfi"ar@, t1le Court field tfiat the defendant 
was not Ol3Iigated to establish that his own Fourth An end-
mel n · ts a e n vw ate , out only that the search and 
seizure of the evidence was unconstitutional.a Upon such a 
showing, the exclusiouary rule would be available to prevent 
the admission of the evidence against the defendant,. 
3 ]u Brown v. United States, 411 U. S., at 229, this Court elarified that. 
the automatic standing rule of Jones was a,ppliC'ablr only where the offense 
rharged "pos~e,~ion of the seized evidence at the t1me of tlw ron1estccl 
earch and se1zure." 
79-244-0PINION 
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The Court found that the prosecution of such possessory 
offenses presented a "special problem" which necessitated the 
departure from the then-settled principles of Fourth Amend-
ment "standing." 4 Two circumstances were found to require 
this exception. First, the Court found that in order to estab-
lish standing at a hearing on a motion to suppress, the defend-
ant would often be "forced to allege facts the proof of which 
would tend , if indeed not be sufficient, to convict him," since 
several Courts of Appeals had "pinioned a defendant within 
this dilemma" by holdi11g that evidence adduced at the motion 
to suppress could be used against the defendant at trial. 362 
r. 8., at 262. The Court declined to embrace any rule which 
would require a defendant to assert his Fourth Amendment 
claims only at the risk of providing the prosecution with self-
incriminatillg statements admissible at trial. The Court 
sought resolution of this dilemma by relieving the defendant 
of the obligation of establishing that his Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated by an illegal search or seizure. 
The Court also commented that this rule would be bene-
ficial for a second reason. Without a rule prohibiting a gov-
ernment challenge to a defendant's "standing" to invoke the 
exclusionary rule in a possessory offense prosecution, the gov-
ernment would be allowed the "advantage of contradictory 
positions.·· I d., at 263. The Court reasoned that the gov-
ernment ought not to be allowed to assert that the defendant 
possessed the goods for purposes of criminal liability, while 
simultaneously asserting that he did not possess them for the 
purposes of claiming the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The Court found that, "[i] t is not consonaut with the 
4 In Raka,s. this Court di~canl<•cl rdiauce on concepts of "~ta nding" in 
determmmg whether a drfendant is rntitled to claim the protectiOn~ of the 
!•xelusJOnar~· rulP . The inquiry, after Rakas, ts simply whethrr thr dc-
femhmt '~ rights were violated by the allrgedly Illegal scan·h or ~eizurc . 
Becau~c Jones was decided at a time when ";;tanding" wa;; de~ignatrd ns u 
·eparale mquir ' , we use that. term for the purposes of re-examining that 
opinion. 
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amenities, to put it mildly, of the administration of criminal 
justice, to sanction such squarely contradictory assertions of 
power by the Government." !d., at 263-264. Thus in order 
to prevent both the risk that self-incrimination would attach 
to the assertion of Fourth Amendment rights, as well as to 
prevent the "vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction," see 
Brown v. United States, 411 U. S., at 229, the £_Ourt adopted 
the rule of "automatic standing." :=. 
In ~he 20 years which have lapsed since the Court's de-
cision in Jones, the two reasons which led the Court to the 
rule of automatic standing have likewise been aft'ected b time. 
This our as he t a testimony given by a defendant in 
support of a motion to suppress cannot be admitted as evi-
dence of his guilt at trial. Simmons v. United States, 390 
U. S. 377 (1968). Developments in the principles of Fourth 
Amendment standing, as well, clarify that a prosecutor may, 
with legal consistency and legitimacy, assert that a defendant 
charged with possession of a seized item did not have a privacy 
interest violated in the course of the search and seizure. We 
are convinced not only that the original tenets of the Jones 
decision have eroded, but also that no alternative principles 
exist to support retention of the rule. 
The "dilemma" identified Ain Jones, that a delendan~ 
with a possessory oft'ense might only be able to establish his 
standing to challenge a search am] seizure by giving self-
incriminating testimony admissible as evidence of his guilt, 
was elimiuated by our decision in Simmons v. United States, 
S'Upra. In Simmons, the defendant Garrett was charged with 
bank robbery. During the search of a codefendaut's mother's 
house, physical evidence used in the bank robbery, including 
a suitcase, was found in tli~ basement and seized. In au 
eft'ort to establish his standing to assert the illegality of the 
search , Garrett testified at the suppression hearing that the, 
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suitcase was similar to one he o-w11ed and that he was the 
owner of the clothing discovered inside the suitcase. Gar-
r<'tt's motion to suppress was denied. but his testimony 
wa admitted into evidencr against him as part of tfie gov-
ernnwn s case-m-e ne at rial. This Court reversed. finding 
that "n drf<'IJdant who knO\n~ that hiF: trstimony may be 
adrnissiblc against him at trial will sometimes be deterred 
from preseuting the testimonial proof of standing 11ecessary 
to assert a Fourth Amendment claim." 390 U. S., at 392-393. 
The Court found that in effect, the defendant was 
"obliged either to give up what he belirvecl. with advice 
of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendm<'nt claim or, in 
legal effect. to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-i1lcrimination. In these circumstances. we 
find it intolerable that one constitutional right should 
have to be surrrnderecl in order to assert another. We 
therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in support 
of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment 
grounds. his testimony may not thereafter be admitted 
against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes 
no objection." Id., at 394. 
This Court's ruliug in Simmons thus not only extends pro-
tectiou against this risk of self-incrimination in all of the 
cases covered by Jones, but also grants a form of "use im-
munity" to those defendants charged with nonpossessory 
crimes. [n this respect. the protection of Simmons is there-
fore broader than that of Jones. Thus as we stated in Brown 
v. tlntted Sta:fes, 411 U. S., at 228, "[tlhe self-incrimination 
dilemma, so central to tho Jones decision, can no longer occur 
under the prevailing interpretation of tho Constitution [in 
Simmons]." 
B 
This Court has identified the self-incrimination rationale as 
the cornerstone of the Jones opinion. See Brown v. United 
~tates; 411 U. S., at 228. We need not belabor the question 
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of whether the "vice" of prosecutorial contradiction could 
alone support a rule countenancing the exclusion of probative 
evidence on the grounds that someone other than the defendant 
was denied a Fourth Amendment right. The simple answer 
is that the decisions of this Court, especially our most recent 
decision in Rakas v. Illinois, supra, clearly establish that a 
prosecutor may simultalleously maintain that a defendant 
criminally possessed the seized good, but was not subject to a 
Fourth Amendment deprivation, without legal contradiction. 
To conclude that a prosecutor engaged in self-contradiction 
in J o·nes, the Court necessarily relied on the unexamined as-
sumption that a defendallt's possession of a seized good suffi-
cient to establish criminal culpability was also sufficient to 
establish Forth Amendment "standing." This assumption, 
however, even if correct at the time, is no longer so." 
~ 
The person in legal possession of a good seized during an 
illegal search has not necessarily been subject to a Fourth 
Amendment deprivation. 0 As we hold today in Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, post, at-, legal possession of a seized good is not 
a proxy for determining whether the owner had a Fourth 
Amendment iHterest for it does not invariably represent the 
protected Fourth Amendment interest. This Court has re-
peatedly repudiated the notion that "arcane distinctions de-
veloped in property and tort law" ought to control our Fourth 
5 Re::;pondent Salvucci rile thi,; ,.,tourt '::; dPei~ion in United States v. 
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) , a~ ~npifort, for the view that. legal ownen;hip 
of the ~eizNl gooJ wa.~ ~ufiiriPJit . to ronfer Fout.h Amendment, "::;tanding." 
In Rakas, however, we ~tated that. "f::<ltancling i11 !Pffers wa::< ba;;:ed on 
Jeffrr::;' po&~e~::;ory intere,;t in both thr prrmi::<r;-; searchrd a11d tho property 
seized ." 439 r. S., at 1:36 . (Empha~>i~ ad(IPd.) 
" Legal po,;se~::;iou of tlw ::;eizrd good may WE'll bE' suiJ-iciPn! to Pnt.itle it 
rlofE>ndant to dnim the benefit~ of the Pxclusionar~· rule if !he seizure, as 
oppOH('d to the HP<trch, was illE-gal. SPP, e. g., United ' State/! v. Lisk, 5~2 
F. 2d 228 (CA7 1975), rert. denied, .,12;3 U. S. 107i:l (1976) (STEVENS, J .) . 
HrspondE>utK, however, did not challengr the ron::;tttutJonality of the: 
seiznrp or the evidence. 
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Amendment inquiry. Ralws v. lll·inois, 439 U. S., at 143. In 
another section of the opinion in Jones its<.'lf, the ourt con-
cluded that, "it is unnec0ssary and ill-advised to import into 
the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable se·arches and seizures subtle distinctions, de-
veloped and refined by the common law in evolving the body 
of private prop0rty law .... " 362 U. S .. at 266. See also 
MancUiri v. DeForte, 302 U. S. 364 (1968); Warden v. 
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
While prop<>rty ownership is clearly a factor to be consid-
ered 'ill determini,!!$ whether l:!:ll. mdividual's Fourtl;A;end-
ment rights hav~ been ;rol~ted. see Rakas, SU{Yf'a, 439 U. S .. 
at 144, n. 12, prOj)erty rights are neither the beginning nor 
the f'nd of this Court's inquiry. In Rakas, this Court held ~ 
that an ill<' gal sf'arch only violates the rights of those who 
have "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded 
place." 'Rakas, -!d. , at 140. See aTso M ancus~ v. DeForte, -supra. 
We simply decline to usc possession of a seized good as a 
substitute for a fa;etual finding that the owner of the good 
had a legitimate' expectation of privacy in the area searched. 
Tn Jones, thf' Court held not only that automatic standing 
should be conferred to defendants charged with crin1f's of 
]Jossession, but altematively, that Jones had actual standing 
because he was "legitimately on the premises" at the time of 
the search. In Rakas, this Court rejected the adequacy of 
this second Jones sta11darcl. finding that it was "too broad a 
gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights." 439 
U. S., at 142. In languag<> appropriate to our consideration 
of the automatic standing rule as well. W<' reasoned that : 
"In abandoning 'legitimately on premises' for the doc-
trine that we announce today, we are not forsaking a 
time-tested and workable rule, which has produced con-
sistent results when applied, solely for the sake of fidelity 
to the values underlying· the Fourth Amendment, 
Ln 
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Rather, we are rejecting blind adherence to a phrase 
which at most has superficial clarity and which conceals 
underneath that thin veneer all of the problems of line 
drawing which must be faced in any conscientious effort 
to apply the Fourth Amendment. Where the fa.ctual 
premises for a rule are so generally prevalent that little 
would be lost and much would be gained by abandoning 
'Case-by-case analysis, we have not hesitated to do so ... . 
We would not wish to be understood as saying that legiti-
mate presence on the premises is irrelevant to one's ex-
pectation of privacy, but it cannot be deemed controlling." 
Jd. , at 147- 148. 
As in Rakas, we again reject "blind adherence" to the other 
underlying assumption in Jones that possession of the seized 
good is an acceptable measure of Fourth Amendment interests. 
As in Rakas, we find that the Jones standard "creates too 
broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights" 
and that we must instead engage in a "conscientious effort to 
apply the Fourth Amendment" by asking not merely whether 
the defendant had a possessory interest in the items seized, 
but whether he had an expectation of privacy in the area 
searched. Thus neither prosecutorial "vice," nor the under-
lying assumption of Jones that possession of a seized good is 
J the equivalent of :F'ourth Ame:idment "standing" to challenge 
the search, can save the automatic standing rule. 
c 
Even though the original foundations of Jones have crum-
bled, respondents assert that principles not articulated by the 
\ 
-:+ Court in Jones support retention of the rule. First, ~ 
Ll(<~e.;~S~f~O~\J~~~~~:\H~S:_j~~b~· g~n~8+Srs maintain that while Simmons v. United States, supra, 
~liminated the possibility that the prosecutor could use a 
defendant's testimo11y at a suppression hearing as substantive 
evidence of guilt at trial , Simmons did not eliminate other 
risks to the defendant which attach to giving testimony at a 
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motion to suppress. 7 Principally, respoudents assert that the 
prosecutor may still be permitted to use the defendant's testi-
mony to impeach him at trial,S This Court has not decided 
whether Simmons precludes the use of a defendant's testi-
mony at a suppression hearing to impeach his testimony at. 
trial.9 But the issue prese11ted here is quite different from 
the one of whether "use immunity" extends only through the 
government's case-in-chief, or beyond that to the direct and 
cross-examination of a defendant in the event he chooses to 
take the stand. That issue need not be and is not resolved 
here, for it is an issue which more aptly relates to the proper 
breadth of the Simmons privilege, and not to the need for 
retaining automatic standing. 
Respondents also seek to retain the Jones rule on the 
grounds that it is said to maximize the deterrence of illegal 
police conduct by permitting an expanded class of potential 
challengers. The same a.rgument has been rejected by this 
Court as a sufficient basis for allowing persons whose Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated to nevertheless claim 
7 The re:>pondent.-; argue that the JH'o::;pcutor's acce~s to the suppr<'~~ion 
te.,timony will unfairly providE' tlw pro><ecutor with information Hdvan-
tagpou~ to the' prepar<ltion of hi:; case and trial ::;tratPgy. Thi>< argumPnt, 
however, is sure!~· apphrabiP equally to pos:;e;:;:;or~· and nonpOI"SP~sory 
offenses. This Court. has ckarly dPclined to expand thE' Jones rule' to 
other claH::es of oti<:>u8eB, Alderman v. Unzted States. Brown v. Ulllted 
States, and thm; reo;pon<hmtH' rational<' eannot support the' retentwn of a 
:;;prcial rulr of automatic standing hC're. 
8 A number of court;,; con::;iclering the que:;tion hav<:> held that such l<'><ti-
mony i:-l admissible' a:; pvidente of impParhmPnt. Gray v. State, 43 l\1d. 
App. 2:~t:, 408 A. Zd 85:3 (1979); People "· DouglWJ, ()() Cal. App. 3d 998, 
13() Cal. Rptr. 358 (Hl77); People v. Sturgis. 58 Ill. 2cl 211, 317 K. E. 2cl 
545 (Hl74) . SC'e al:<o ·woodie Y. United States,- U.S. App. D. C. -, 
:mo~ F. 2d 130, 131-132 (BuRoEH, .1.), cPrt. denied, 389 U.S. 961 (1967). 
0 Thi~ Court hat'! hPld that, ''the protectiw ~hielcl of Simmons is uot lo 
he convrrtecl into a Jicpn:;e for fabc represC'nt<Ltion:; . . •. " United States: 
v. Kaha11 , 415 U.S. 239 (1974) , 
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the benefits of the exclusionary rule. In Alderman, v. United 
States, supra, 394 U.S., at 174-175, we explicitly stated that: 
"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of 
those whose rights the police have violated have been 
considered sufficient to justify the suppression of proba-
tive evide11ce even though the case against the defendant 
is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. 
But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of 
extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would 
justify further encroachment upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them ac-
quitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence 
which exposes the truth." 
See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S., at 137; United States v. 
Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268. 275-276 (1978); United States v. 
/ Calandr·a, 414 U. S. 338, 350-351 (1974). Respondents' de-
terrence argument carries no special force in the context of 
possessory offenses and we therefore again reject it. 
We are convinced that the automatic standing rule of Jones 
has outlived its usefulness in this Court's Fourth Ameudment 
jurisprudence. The doctriue now serves only to afford a wind-
fall to defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have not 
been violated. We are unwilling to tolerate the exclusion of 
probative evidence under such circumstances since we adhere 
to the view of Alderman that the values of the Fourth Amend-
ment are fully preserved by a rule which limits the avail-
ability of the exclusionary rule to defendants who have been 
subjected to a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. 
This action comes to us as a challenge to a pretrial decision 
suppressing evidence. The respondents relied on automatic 
standing and did not attempt to establish that they had a 
legitimate expectation of priva:cy in the areas of Zackular's 
mother's home where the goods were seized. We therefore 
think it appropriate to remand so that respondents will have 
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an opportunity to demonstrate, if they can, that their own 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated. See Combs v. 
United States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972) . 
Remanded. 
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